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Abstract Q-particles are functional items that are used to form alternative-related
constructions. This paper investigates a hitherto understudied use of the Japanese
Q-particle ka in which it occurs immediately below the declarative complementizer
and imposes constraints on the doxastic state of the attitude holder. I show that
this use of ka is licensed only under a limited range of attitude predicates, and
once licensed, it encodes the presupposition that the attitude holder is ‘uncertain’
regarding the truth value of the proposition denoted by the embedded sentence.
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1 Introduction
Q-particles are functional items that are used to form various ‘alternative-related’
constructions, such as questions, disjunctives, indefinites, etc. (Hagstrom 1998;
Cable 2007, 2010; Szabolcsi 2015; Uegaki 2018; a.o.). Q-particles are attested
cross-linguistically, with variation among languages as to the range of constructions
they may occur in. As has been observed in the literature, the Japanese Q-particle
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This paper discusses an aspect of the Japanese Q-particle which is distinct from those
extensively studied cases. Consider (5). Here the sentences involve a declarative
sentence embedded under the predicate ‘kitaisuru (hope)’. As (5b) shows, ka may
























(lit.) ‘Jo hopes that IF she will be elected.’
This apparently optional occurrence of ka adds the implication that the commitment
of the attitude holder toward the proposition denoted by the embedded sentence
is ‘weaker’ than that conveyed by the ka-less counterpart in (5a). I call these
occurrences of ka ‘modally functioning Q-particles (MFQs)’, as they seem to
impose constraints on the attitude holder’s doxastic state. I also posit ‘kaMFQ’ as the
entry that encodes the relevant semantic function. For convenience, I express the
intuition behind kaMFQ by placing ‘IF’ after the complementizer ‘that’ in translations,
as if this were the English counterpart of this item.
This paper aims to explicate the nature of kaMFQ, providing a precise description
of its distribution and semantic contribution. In Section 2, I investigate which attitude
predicates license kaMFQ. In Section 3, I propose a formal analysis that captures
the distribution of kaMFQ and the semantic difference associated with the presence
or absence of kaMFQ. In Section 4, I discuss how kaMFQ interacts with embedded
epistemic modals. In Section 5, I conclude.
2 The distribution of kaMFQ
This section investigates which attitudes are able to license kaMFQ. Section 2.1
introduces the classification of attitudes proposed in Anand & Hacquard (2013).
Section 2.2 shows that kaMFQ is only licensed by a certain class of attitude predicates
within the classification by Anand and Hacquard. Section 2.3 shows how kaMFQ is
differentiated from apparently similar cases of ka observed in the literature.
2.1 Classifying attitudes
Generally speaking, the modal context of an embedded clause depends on the
semantics of the embedding predicate. This has often been discussed with respect to
the distribution of indicative and subjunctive moods in Romance languages (Farkas
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1985, 1992; Portner 1997, 2018; Giannakidou 1998; Villalta 2009; a.o.), and the
compatibility with embedded epistemic modals (Anand & Hacquard 2013; Ippolito
2018). Anand & Hacquard (2013) propose to explain the relevant phenomena
based on two semantic properties of attitudes: representationality and preference-
basedness.1 Representational attitudes convey a ‘mental picture’ (Bolinger 1968),
describing the content of a propositionally consistent attitudinal state. Preference-
based attitudes convey an ordering among alternatives, just as ‘want φ ’ is analyzed
as asserting that φ is preferred over ¬φ (see Heim 1992).
Assuming that there are no attitudes that are both non-representational and non-
preference-based, attitudes are classified into the following three classes. The first
subsumes attitudes that are representational and non-preference-based. This class,
which Anand and Hacquard call ‘attitudes of acceptance’ (Stalnaker 1984), involves
‘know’, ‘believe’, ‘report’, ‘realize’, etc.2 As they argue, these attitudes are typically
indicative-governors, and allow epistemic modals to appear under them, whether
possibility or necessity ones. (6) shows that English believe allows both possibility
and necessity modals. (7) (= Anand & Hacquard 2013: 15) shows that French realize
allows an epistemic modal and this modal shows indicative mood inflection.





















‘Jean realized that Marie must have known her killer.’
The second class subsumes attitudes that are non-representational and preference-
based. This involves desideratives (e.g., ‘want’, ‘wish’), and directives (e.g., ‘or-
der’, ‘demand’). Anand and Hacquard observe that these attitudes are typically
subjunctive-governors, and disallow epistemic modals, whether possibility or neces-
sity ones. (8) (= Anand & Hacquard 2013: 17) shows that French demand disallows
epistemic modals (notice that the modal would select for subjunctive mood).
1 Here I use the term ‘attitudes’ somewhat generally, referring to both abstract mental states and
linguistic expressions that denote such mental states (i.e., attitude predicates).
2 Stalnaker (1984) provides the following description for this term (pp.79-80): ‘Acceptance, as I shall
use this term, is a broader concept than belief; it is a generic propositional attitude concept with
such notions as presupposing, presuming, postulating, positing, assuming and supposing as well
as believing falling under it. ... As a rough criterion, one may say that a propositional attitude
concept is an acceptance concept if the attitude is said to be correct whenever the proposition is true.
Belief is an acceptance concept because a correct belief is a true belief.’ In their account, Anand
and Hacquard expand the coverage of this category by including fiction predicates like ‘dream’ or
‘imagine’. These predicates are not attitudes of acceptance in Stalnaker’s definition but they are in
Anand and Hacquard’s characterization, as they provide a consistent propositional content but do not




Representational Attitudes of acceptance Emotive doxastics / Dubitatives
Non-representational —— Directives / Desideratives





















‘Jean demanded that Marie must have known her killer.’
The third class subsumes attitudes that are both representational and preference-
based. This class includes emotive doxastics (e.g.,‘hope’, ‘fear’), and dubitatives
(e.g., ‘doubt’, ‘suspect’). Anand and Hacquard suggest that this class tends to show
cross-linguistic variation in mood selection due to its hybrid status. Importantly,
they observe that attitudes of this class only allow possibility epistemic modals. This





















‘Jean fears that Marie may have known her killer.’
Anand and Hacquard’s classification is summarized in Table 1. The fact that
emotive doxastics and dubitatives only allow possibility epistemic modals will be
important when we formulate the semantics of kaMFQ in Section 3.
2.2 kaMFQ appears in emotives and dubitatives
Although Japanese does not have a mood system like in Romance languages, com-
plementizers reflect the divisions seen above to some extent. Japanese has a relatively
rich inventory of complementizers (Kuno 1973; Nakau 1973; McCawley 1978; Uchi-
bori 2000; Saito 2012, 2015; Yamada & Kubota 2018; Yamada 2019; a.o.), but here
we focus on ‘to’ and ‘yoo’ for the sake of argument. As the following show, the two
complementizers reflect the representational/non-representational cut very clearly.
(10) and (11) show that to is only compatible with representational attitudes (i.e., at-
titudes of acceptance, emotive doxastics and dubitatives). (12) shows that yoo is only













‘Jo {believes / reported} that Bo will/would come.’
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‘Jo {wishes / demanded} that Bo (would) come’
Now observe that, among the three classes within Anand and Hacquard’s classifi-
cation, the Q-particle ka can only appear under emotive doxastics and dubitatives.
(13) shows that ka cannot appear under attitudes of acceptance. (15) shows that ka is













































‘Jo {wishes / demanded} that IF Bo (would) come’
The class of predicates that can license ka in embedded declaratives is in fact
somewhat larger. As (16) and (17) show, ka may also appear under ‘be excited’ or




















































(lit.) ‘Jo regrets that IF she came too early.’
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Here let me clarify the status of ‘emotive factives’ in Japanese so as to forestall
potential confusions. The term ‘emotive factive’ is somewhat misleading in Japanese,
as factivity may not be triggered by an attitude predicate alone in this language.
In general, emotive factives are analyzed as having the presupposition that the
proposition denoted by the embedded sentence is true in the actual world. Due to
this, when the context entails the negation of the complement of an emotive factive,
the sentence gives rise to a feel of contradiction, as illustrated by English (18).
(18) # Jo was not elected, but she is excited that she was elected.
In Japanese, the presence of a factive presupposition is determined by the interplay
between the choice of a complementizer and the choice of an attitude predicate
(Kuno 1973; McCawley 1978; a.o.). Notably, to is usually assumed to not trigger
a factive presupposition: in the case of be excited and regret, factivity is triggered
by another complementizer ‘koto’ (lit. ‘thing’).3 The difference between the two
complementizers with respect to the existence of a factive presupposition is shown














































(lit.) ‘Jo actually arrived on time. But she regrets that she came too early.’
Given that emotive doxastics do not trigger a factive presupposition, emotive doxas-
tics and what we call ‘emotive factives’ are fundamentally the same kinds of attitudes
3 Note that so-called ‘cognitive factives’ behave somewhat differently with respect to the compatibility
with the complementizers mentioned here: as (i) and (ii) show, these predicates strongly prefer (or


























‘Jo remembers that Bo was elected.’
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in Japanese, as long as to is used as the complementizer. That the two classes can
be unified under to is supported by the fact that the use of to is obligatory to license













(lit.) ‘Jo is excited that IF she was elected.’
I henceforth use ‘emotives’ as a collective term for emotive doxastics and predicates
like be excited or regret. Our conclusion is thus that kaMFQ can only appear under
emotives and dubitatives, as long as to is used as the complementizer.
2.3 Distinguishing kaMFQ from apparently similar cases
Here let me clarify how kaMFQ is distinguished from other apparently similar cases
of ka observed in the literature. Saito (2012, 2015) discusses ‘ka to’ alignments that













(lit.) ‘Jo asked that whether Bo would be elected’
Couched in the Cartographic framework (see, e.g., Cinque & Rizzi 2010), Saito treats
ka and to appearing under these predicates as a FORCE head and a REPORT head
respectively, arguing that they conspire to form a ‘paraphrase of a direct question’.
Saito’s analysis draws an analogy to the behavior of the Spanish complementizer
‘que’. It has been observed that, under predicates of communication like ask,
Spanish que may appear immediately above an interrogative clause (Rivero 1978;



















‘(lit.) They ask that whether AIDS can be cured.’
Lahiri (2002) argues that que in (23) is a ‘quotative marker’ that takes an interrogative
clause as the object of a speech act. Saito’s analysis for Japanese ask basically follows
the same line, assuming that ka is the head of an interrogative clause and to reports
the interrogative clause as the object of a questioning speech act.
While this analysis may work for predicates like ask, I argue that it cannot be
extended to the predicates we have been concerned with, namely emotives and
dubitatives. Firstly, the ‘que + interrogative clause’ combination cannot be used for
emotives and dubitatives in Spanish, as shown in (24).4























‘(lit.) They {hope / doubt} that whether AIDS can be cured.’
Secondly, if ka is a FORCE head and it forms an interrogative clause, we predict that
wh-interrogatives can similarly be headed by to under hope or suspect. However,




























(lit.) ‘Jo {hopes / suspects} that who will be elected.’
Thirdly, when there is an in-situ wh-phrase in the embedded clause, it is much more
difficult for the wh-phrase to take matrix scope under ask than under hope or suspect.
This is shown by the contrast between (27) and (28). This suggests that only in the
former does ka constitute a wh-island equivalent to ‘whether’ and prevent the in-situ
































(lit.) ‘Whoi does Jo {hope / suspect} that IF ti will be elected?’
These data confirm that Q-particles appearing under emotives and dubitatives should
be distinguished from those appearing under predicates of communication like ask.6
In the next section, I will present the main proposal of this paper.
5 Note that the matrix polar question reading (lit. ‘Did Jo ask that who would be elected?’) is available
for (27). Note also that there is no such matrix polar question reading available for hope or suspect:
the only possible construal for (28) is the matrix wh-question reading mentioned in the main text.
6 The argument here has consequences for the treatment of the predicate ‘omou’, which is generally
translated as ‘think’ and is known to allow ka to occur in its embedded clause. Interestingly, the
presence of ka is most natural when the thinking event takes place in the past. Also observe that

















(lit.) ‘Jo {thinks / was thinking / was believing} that IF she will/would be elected.’
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3 Proposal
3.1 The uncertainty presupposition
Recall from Section 2.1 that emotive doxastics and dubitatives only allow possibility
epistemic modals. Anand and Hacquard argue that this is because they involve the
so-called ‘uncertainty presupposition’, whose idea is roughly as follows:
(29) The attitude holder’s doxastic state entails neither φ nor ¬φ (where φ is the
embedded sentence).
Anand and Hacquard assume that (29) is encoded as part of the lexical semantics of
emotive doxastics and dubitatives, at least in English and the Romance languages
they investigated. I argue that, in Japanese, this presupposition is transparently
encoded by kaMFQ as its semantic contribution. That is, I propose that kaMFQ is a
morphological exponent of the uncertainty presupposition in (29).
I illustrate this with the predicate ‘be excited’ here. In (30), whether her university
was elected or not is already settled in the doxastic state of Jo, the attitude holder.
Since Jo’s doxastic state entails the positive answer here, the presence of ka should
lead to infelicity. (30a) shows that it does. In contrast, no infelicity results in the
same context if ka is omitted, as shown in (30b).
(30) Certain: Jo had wanted to hold the conference at her university. She gets
notified that her university has been elected as the venue for next year.
While omou was grouped into the same class of predicates as ask in Saito (2012, 2015), the behavior
of this predicate in fact parallels that of emotives and dubitatives. (ii) shows that ka in an embedded
clause cannot license an in-situ wh-phrase with omou, hence leading to ungrammaticality. (iii) shows




























(lit.) ‘Whoi was Jo thinking that IF ti would be elected?’
Why does omou parallel emotives and dubitatives rather than attitudes of acceptance? As a reviewer
points out, it could be that omou has a somewhat weaker force than other similar predicates like
‘sinziru (believe)’ and it may help avoid going counter to the semantics of kaMFQ. Also, as Yasu
Sudo (p.c.) points out, the fact that the use of ka is mostly restricted to past thinking events suggests
that omou involves some sort of preferential meaning in the relevant cases, because expressing past
thoughts tends to implicate that the attitude holder expected a situation different from what has
actually happened (of course, to fully flesh out this claim, we would need to consider how the tense






























‘Jo is excited that her university was elected.’
Next consider (31). Here the context specifies that whether her university was elected
is still uncertain in Jo’s doxastic state. As we predict, the presence of ka does not
lead to infelicity, since Jo’s doxastic state entails neither the positive nor the negative
answer. Importantly, the absence of ka leads to infelicity here. The reason for this
will be explicated in the next section.
(31) Uncertain: Jo had wanted to host the conference at her university. The raffle




























‘Jo is excited that her university was elected.’
Furthermore, (32) confirms that the uncertainty inference triggered by ka is a pre-
supposition. As (32a) shows, the uncertainty inference projects under negation and
clashes with the global context, which specifies that Jo is certain that her university
was elected as the venue. Compare this with the felicity of (32b), in which the
uncertainty inference is absent due to the lack of ka.
(32) Context: Jo hates to host a conference. Much to her dismay, she has been no-
tified that her university has been elected as the venue for a major conference




























‘It’s not true that Jo is excited that her university was elected.’
It is thus confirmed that kaMFQ encodes an uncertainty presupposition as its semantic
contribution. The idea will be formally implemented in the next section.
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3.2 Formal analysis
I propose that kaMFQ is syntactically a Mood head which projects immediately below
the complementizer to. I assume that kaMFQ combines with a TP, which I analyze as
denoting a proposition (i.e., a set of possible worlds). I thus propose the structure in
(33) for relevant sentences. ‘Att’ stands for attitude predicates; ‘φ ’ stands for TPs.
(33) [VP [CP [MoodP φ kaMFQ ] to ] Att ]
I assume that no MoodP is projected when kaMFQ is absent, and in that case the TP
is directly combined with the complementizer. This is illustrated in (34).
(34) [VP [CP φ to ] Att ]
Like Anand & Hacquard (2013), I assume that the evaluation of a sentence is
relativized to an information state parameter S in addition to a world parameter w,
with information states defined as sets of possible worlds. Recall that representational
attitudes describe the content of a propositionally consistent attitudinal state. Anand
and Hacquard capture this by assuming that representational attitudes provide their
own information states which are distinct from the one given as a parameter. For
instance, believe provides the doxastic state of the attitude holder as its information
state, whereas dream introduces the content of the dream that the attitude holder
has had. For emotive doxastics and dubitatives, Anand and Hacquard assume that
they make use of the doxastic state of the attitude holder as their information state. I
extend this assumption to predicates like be excited and regret here.
Here I focus on the formulation of the presuppositional content. A comprehensive
account of emotives and dubitatives would need to encompass their assertive content
(e.g., preference or likelihood) too, but I will ignore it here for ease of exposition.
Relevant issues will be addressed in Section 4, where I will discuss how the current
framework would have to be modified to incorporate the preferential component.
As argued in Section 3.1, kaMFQ is analyzed as encoding an uncertainty presup-
position, which requires that the information state provided by the attitude predicate
entail neither φ nor ¬φ . This presupposition is formulated as the requirement that
the information state include at least one φ -world and at least one ¬φ -world. This
is illustrated in (35). Here ‘SAtt’ is meant as the information state provided by Att
(e.g., in the case of believe, SAtt is identified with Doxxw). ‘· · · ’ in the formula will be
replaced by the assertive content of each predicate.
(35)
q
[VP [CP [MoodP φ kaMFQ] to ] Att ]
yw,S
= λx : ∃w′ ∈ SAtt . JφKw
′,SAtt ∧ ∃w′′ ∈ SAtt . J¬φKw
′′,SAtt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Uncertainty Presupposition
. · · ·
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When kaMFQ is absent, the sentence encodes no presupposition (assuming that there
are no other presuppositions projecting from below), as shown in (36).
(36)
q
[VP [CP φ to ] Att ]
yw,S
= λx : ︸ ︷︷ ︸
No Presupposition
. · · ·
The semantics proposed in (35) and (36) derive the contrasts observed in Section
3.1. First consider Certain, the context in (30), which specifies that Jo knows that
her university was elected as the venue. As we assume, the predicate be excited
provides the doxastic state of the attitude holder as its information state. Since Jo
is fully certain, it is true at every world in her doxastic state that her university was
elected as the venue. This status of the doxastic state clashes with the uncertainty
presupposition of kaMFQ, which requires that the doxastic state include at least one
world at which Jo’s university was not elected as the venue, hence infelicity. The
sentence without kaMFQ is unproblematic here, since it comes with no presupposition.
Next consider Uncertain, the context in (31), which specifies that whether her
university was elected as the venue is uncertain in Jo’s doxastic state. Here the
presence of kaMFQ is unproblematic, since the doxastic state here includes both
worlds where her university was elected and worlds where it wasn’t. Now why
does the sentence without kaMFQ, which involves no presupposition and thus seems
innocuous in this context, end up being infelicitous here? I argue that this is because
it competes with the sentence with kaMFQ in terms of presuppositional strength.7
Specifically, the sentence with kaMFQ has a stronger presupposition than the sentence
without kaMFQ, and since the use of the former is felicitous in the present context,
the use of the latter is prohibited by Maximize Presupposition! (Heim 1991), which
requires that the speaker use the felicitous sentence with the strongest presupposition
among alternatives.8 The use of the sentence without kaMFQ thus violates Maximize
Presupposition!, hence the infelicity of the sentence.
7 I thank Wataru Uegaki for suggesting this line of analysis.
8 When the context is compatible with the stronger presupposition, the use of the sentence with the
weaker presupposition triggers the ‘anti-presupposition’, the inference that the stronger presupposition
is false (Percus 2006; Sauerland 2008; Schlenker 2012; a.o.). In the current case, using the sentence
without kaMFQ while the context is compatible with the presupposition of kaMFQ gives rise to the
inference that ¬(∃w′ ∈ SAtt . JφKw
′,SAtt ∧∃w′′ ∈ SAtt . J¬φKw
′′,SAtt ). However, the inference we would
obtain is in fact stronger than this; it is inferred from the use of the sentence without kaMFQ that
¬∃w′′ ∈ SAtt . J¬φKw
′′,SAtt , the negation of the right conjunct of the uncertainty presupposition. This
stronger inference is derived if emotives and dubitatives are assumed to require (as an assertive
content) that ∃w′ ∈ SAtt . JφKw
′,SAtt . Indeed, as has been suggested in the literature, predicates like
hope require the attitude holder to believe the possibility of the embedded sentence (Portner 1992;
Scheffler 2008; Anand & Hacquard 2013; a.o.). It would thus be more precise to say that the infelicity
of the sentence without kaMFQ in Uncertain is derived from the conflict between the doxastic state that
is still uncertain regarding the truth value of the proposition in question, and the anti-presupposition
triggered by the non-use of kaMFQ.
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3.3 Explaining the incompatibility with kaMFQ
We observed in Section 2.2 that some predicates are incompatible with the presence
of kaMFQ. Why is kaMFQ not licensed under these predicates? Recall first that attitudes















(lit.) ‘Jo {believes / reported} that IF Bo will/would come.’
I suggest that the reason why attitudes of acceptance are incompatible with kaMFQ
is because they normally involve universal quantification over an information state,
which necessarily contradicts the uncertainty presupposition of kaMFQ. Recall that
attitudes of acceptance are representational, thus they provide their own information
states as quantification domains. If one believes φ , φ is true in every world in one’s
doxastic state. If one reports φ , φ is true in every world in the informational content
generated by the relevant report. This universal quantification is unproblematic when
kaMFQ is absent since there will be no presupposition then, as shown in (38).
(38)
q
[VP [CP φ to ] Att.Acc ]
yw,S
= λx : ︸ ︷︷ ︸
No Presup.
. ∀w′ ∈ SAtt . JφKw
′,SAtt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Assertive Content
However, when kaMFQ is present, their assertive content necessarily contradicts the
right conjunct of the uncertainty presupposition: while the former requires that φ be
true at every world in SAtt , the latter requires that ¬φ be true at some world in SAtt .
This explains the incompatibility between attitudes of acceptance and kaMFQ.
(39) J[[[MoodP φ kaMFQ ] to ] Att.Acc ]Kw,S
= λx : ∃w′ ∈ SAtt . JφKw
′,SAtt ∧ ∃w′′ ∈ SAtt . J¬φKw
′′,SAtt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Presupposition
. ∀w′′′ ∈ SAtt . JφKw
′′′,SAtt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Assertive Content
We also observed that desideratives and directives are incompatible with kaMFQ.
The relevant example is repeated in (40). Recall that these attitudes select for the















(lit.) ‘Jo {wishes / demanded} that IF Bo (would) come’
Since desideratives and directives are non-representational attitudes, they do not
provide consistent information states, in contrast to attitudes of acceptance or emo-
tives/dubitatives. Anand & Hacquard (2013) capture this by assuming that non-
representational attitudes provide the empty set as their information state. What
417
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I suggest here is that the complementizer yoo encodes exactly this information,
namely that the relevant information state is empty. Crucially, then, the presence of
yoo necessarily renders kaMFQ’s uncertainty presupposition false, as shown in (41):
because the domain is empty, there are no worlds at which φ is true, nor ones at
which ¬φ is true, hence both conjuncts are false. Using kaMFQ and yoo together thus
implies that the presupposition of the whole sentence can never be satisfied.
(41) J[[[MoodP φ kaMFQ ] yoo ] Des/Dir ]Kw,S
= λx : ∃w′ ∈ /0. JφKw
′, /0 ∧ ∃w′′ ∈ /0. J¬φKw
′′, /0︸ ︷︷ ︸
Presupposition
. · · ·
4 A puzzle: the licensing of embedded epistemic modals
This section discusses how the presence or absence of kaMFQ affects the embedding
of possibility and necessity epistemic modals. As will be shown, epistemic modals
embedded under emotives and dubitatives exhibit effects in Japanese that are un-
expected in light of what is known from English and Romance languages. Here I
will concentrate on describing the puzzle, so that it can be thoroughly investigated
in future research. I will first introduce the basic idea regarding embedded epistemic
modals, then briefly explain how the uncertainty presupposition will be modified to
deal with sentences involving embedded epistemic modals, and finally show how
kaMFQ interacts with embedded epistemic modals.
Recall from Section 2.1 that only representational attitudes can accommodate
epistemic modals in the embedded clause. Anand & Hacquard (2013) argue that
this is because only representational attitudes can provide a consistent information
state which can be utilized by embedded epistemic modals, on the assumption that
epistemic modals obtain their modal bases via anaphoric reference to information
states (Veltman 1996; Yalcin 2007; Hacquard 2010; a.o.). This dependency on
information states involved in epistemic modals is captured by assuming that their
evaluation is solely sensitive to the information state parameter, as shown in (42).
(42) a. Jmight φKw,S = 1 iff ∃w′ ∈ S. JφKw′,S
b. Jmust φKw,S = 1 iff ∀w′ ∈ S. JφKw′,S
When an epistemic modal is embedded under a representational attitude, its quantifi-
cation domain is identified with the information state provided by that attitude. The
interpretation of the matrix VP in (43) (repeated from (6)) is illustrated in (44) and
(45). As an attitude of acceptance, believe can embed both possibility and necessity
modals (notice that in each case the outer quantification ends up being redundant).
(43) John believes that Paul {might / must} have killed her.
418
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(44) Jbelieve might φKw,S
= λx.∀w′ ∈ SAtt .Jmight φKw
′,SAtt
= λx.∀w′ ∈ SAtt .∃w′′ ∈ SAtt .JφKw
′′,SAtt
= λx.∃w′ ∈ SAtt .JφKw
′,SAtt
(where SAtt = Doxxw)
(45) Jbelieve must φKw,S
= λx.∀w′ ∈ SAtt .Jmight φKw
′,SAtt
= λx.∀w′ ∈ SAtt .∀w′′ ∈ SAtt .JφKw
′′,SAtt
= λx.∀w′ ∈ SAtt .JφKw
′,SAtt
(where SAtt = Doxxw)
Also recall that emotives and dubitatives can only embed possibility modals. The
relevant French example is repeated in (46). Anand & Hacquard (2013) argue that
necessity modals are disallowed due to the uncertainty presupposition involved in
these predicates: although they provide an information state for epistemic modals,
the semantics of necessity modals clashes with the requirement that the information





















‘Jean fears that Marie may have known her killer.’
Now notice that the current framework must be modified to give a compositional
account of sentences involving embedded epistemic modals like (46). Recall that
emotives and dubitatives are preference-based attitudes, which means that they in-
volve comparison among propositional alternatives. In (46), the embedded sentence
is modalized, and from a compositional standpoint, it would be this modalized sen-
tence and its negation that are to be compared. However, as the evaluation of modals
is not world-sensitive in the current setting, the proposition ‘λw.∃w′ ∈ S.JφKw′,S’ is
uniformly true or false throughout S depending on whether there is a φ -world in
S, and so is its negative counterpart ‘λw.¬∃w′ ∈ S.JφKw′,S’. Comparing these two
propositions would thus be comparing a necessary truth and a necessary falsehood
relative to S, making no meaningful claim about one’s preference or likelihood.
To avoid this problem, Anand & Hacquard (2013) formalize the preferential
meaning as comparison among ‘sets of information states’, introducing the notion of
‘verifiers’ and ‘falsifiers’. Roughly, φ -verifiers/falsifiers in an information state S are
subsets of S relative to which φ is persistently true/false.9 Anand and Hacquard re-
define the preferential meaning of preference-based attitudes as comparison between
φ -verifiers and φ -falsifiers, which is assumed to represent how the attitude holder
wants her uncertainty ‘φ or ¬φ ’ to be settled. This information-state-based definition
of preference allows us to compare modalized sentences in a similar fashion: that is,
9 Formally, the set of φ -verifiers in S is the set of sub-states S′ ⊆ S such that for any S′′ ⊆ S′, φ is true in
every w ∈ S′′ (φ -falsifiers are defined as ¬φ -verifiers; see Anand & Hacquard 2013 for more detailed
elaboration of these notions). Note that S′ and S′′ here would have to be restricted to non-empty sets;
otherwise a state that falsifies φ would contain a φ -verifier (i.e., the empty set), and vice versa.
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in (46), one compares subsets of Jean’s doxastic state that verify ‘Marie may have
known her killer’ against subsets of Jean’s doxastic state that falsify it.
Anand and Hacquard reformulate the uncertainty presupposition based on ver-
ifiers and falsifiers: e.g., ‘hope φ ’ is analyzed as presupposing that there be some
φ -verifier and some φ -falsifier in one’s doxastic state. Now consider ‘hope must
φ ’. Since ‘must φ ’ requires that every world in the doxastic state be a φ -world, it
contradicts the requirement that there be a ‘must φ ’-falsifier in the doxastic state. In
contrast, ‘hope might φ ’ does not lead to contradiction: ‘might φ ’ requires that there
be some φ -world in the doxastic state, and this does not clash with the presence of a
‘might φ ’-falsifier in the same doxastic state. The refined semantics thus correctly
captures the fact regarding the embedding of possibility and necessity modals under
emotives and dubitatives, at least for English and Romance languages.
With this in mind, let us turn to Japanese. First consider necessity modals. (47a)
shows that predicates can embed a necessity modal when kaMFQ is absent. This is
not surprising: since kaMFQ is absent, it is not required that there be some ‘must
φ ’-falsifier in the doxastic state, hence no clash with the necessity modal. (47b)
shows that predicates cannot embed a necessity modal when kaMFQ is present. This is
not surprising either: the requirement that there be some ‘must φ ’-falsifier conflicts
































(lit.) ‘Jo {hopes / suspects} that IF Bo must have won.’
Now here is the puzzle. As shown in (48), possibility modals can be embedded when






























(lit.) ‘Jo {hopes / suspects} that IF Bo might have won.’
The badness of (48b) is surprising. Given the semantics introduced just above,
(48b) would be analyzed as at least requiring that there be some ‘might φ ’-falsifier
in the doxastic state (due to the uncertainty presupposition of kaMFQ), and there is
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some φ -world in the doxastic state (i.e., the semantics of ‘might φ ’), but the two
requirements do not contradict. Japanese thus seems to differ from English and
Romance languages. As seen in (46), French fear can embed a possibility modal.
As shown in (49), English hope can similarly embed a possibility modal.
(49) John hopes that it might be raining.
Why is Japanese (48b) unacceptable in contrast to French (46) and English (49)?
One possibility that I can think of is that the possibility modal in (48) is actually
located in the Mood projection, functioning as a ‘mood-indicating’ modal (e.g.,
Portner 1997) and encoding the same presupposition as kaMFQ does. The presence
of this modal and kaMFQ in one sentence would lead to clash, as they would occupy
the same syntactic position. The reason why possibility modals can be embedded
under relevant predicates in English and Romance languages could be because these
languages do not have such syntactic competition among more than one element. In
fact, this dividing line separating Japanese from English or French correlates with
the presence or absence of a morpheme that transparently encodes the uncertainty
presupposition. Japanese has such a morpheme (i.e., kaMFQ), which appears within
the embedded clause and thus could syntactically compete with the possibility modal
in the same clause. English and French encode the uncertainty presupposition
opaquely within the semantics of emotives and dubitatives, which may preempt a
potential competition with a modal in the embedded clause.
The account here is still vague, and there may be other possible accounts that
could explain the discrepancy between Japanese and English and Romance lan-
guages. I must leave further investigation for another occasion.
5 Conclusion
I conclude this paper with remarks on three areas on which the proposed account
has interesting implications. The first is the semantics of mood, especially that of
subjunctive mood. As noted in Section 2, the Romance subjunctive is typically
selected by preference-based attitudes, with desideratives and directives being core
cases. Although there is overlap in terms of distribution, kaMFQ cannot be simply
equated to the Romance subjunctive, as the former is licensed by a smaller class of
attitudes than the latter generally is (recall that the core subjunctive cases are covered
by a distinct complementizer, i.e., yoo). That said, I point out that kaMFQ in fact
shares some traits with subjunctive mood, at least in some non-Romance languages.
Smirnova (2014) argues that the choice of indicative or subjunctive in Bulgarian
depends on how strongly the attitude holder is committed to the proposition denoted
by the embedded sentence. In particular, she argues that the Bulgarian subjunctive
encodes the ‘domain heterogeneity’ of the information state, which exactly resembles
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the semantic contribution of kaMFQ proposed in this paper. The function of kaMFQ is
thus probably not a language-specific quirk, but rather instantiates a more general
semantic concept, which could be encoded in different languages in different ways.
kaMFQ thus adds an interesting twist to the linguistic variation of mood encoding.
The second is the licensing of so-called ‘expletive negation’, the phenomenon in
which the negation marker loses its truth-conditional meaning (Portner & Zanuttini
2000; Abels 2005; Yoon 2011, 2013; a.o.). Yoon (2011, 2013) observes that expletive
negation (which she calls ‘evaluative negation’) is licensed under predicates like
hope or fear in Japanese and Korean. As shown in (50), the negative marker ‘nai’
loses its logical meaning, as is evident from the fact that the sentence implies that Jo













(lit.) ‘Jo was hoping that IF Bo wouldn’t come.’  Jo wanted Bo to come
Yoon claims that the licensing of expletive negation correlates with the presence
of what she calls a ‘non-factive’ complementizer, which she identifies with the ‘ka
to’ complex for Japanese. While it is treated as a single unit in her gloss, we have
already observed that it is decomposable into the complementizer to and the Mood
head kaMFQ. Furthermore, I point out that it is rather this Mood head that is crucial to
the licensing of expletive negation. Consider (51). Once ka is omitted, the negative
marker no longer constitutes expletive negation; the sentence only implies that Jo











(lit.) ‘Jo was hoping that Bo wouldn’t come.’  Jo did not want Bo to come
This is in fact consistent with Yoon’s claim that expletive negation is licensed by
‘non-veridicality’ (Giannakidou 1998), a concept which is very similar to the idea
of ‘uncertainty’ we have defined. While further research is needed, I suggest that
kaMFQ plays a pivotal role in the licensing of expletive negation.
The final issue is the semantics of Q-particles. Just as questions, disjunctives
and indefinites presume the existence of more than one live alternative (Ciardelli,
Groenendijk & Roelofsen 2018), kaMFQ requires the agent’s doxastic state to be open
to multiple possibilities for settling issues. The idea of uncertainty behind kaMFQ
thus shares the same semantic core as other occurrences of ka in (1)-(4). While it
remains to be seen whether Q-particles in other languages have the same function as
I have shown for Japanese ka, this study has contributed to our further understanding
of this extensively studied functional item, highlighting its hitherto understudied
aspect as an element that operates on the doxastic state of the attitude holder.
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